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Abstract. Theory is a central element in research.  Due to the importance of 
theory in research, considerable efforts have been made to better understand the 
process of theorizing, i.e., development of a theory.  A review of the literature 
in this area suggests that two dominant theorizing approaches are anchored to 
deductive and inductive reasoning respectively.  In contrast, an essential part of 
theorizing for design may involve abductive reasoning.  The purpose of design 
theory is not to advance declarative logic regarding truth or falseness, but to 
guide learning and problem solving through the conceptualization of a design 
artifact.  This paper critically examines the process of theorizing for design by 
developing an idealized design theorizing framework.  The framework indicates 
that theorizing for design operates in two distinct domains: instance and ab-
stract.  Further, four key theorizing activities are identified in this framework: 
abstraction, solution search, de-abstraction, and registration.  The framework 
provides grounds for building strong design theories in the design science para-
digm by explicating the underlying theorizing process for design. 
Keywords: Design Theory, Theorizing in Design Science Research. 
1   Introduction 
Design science research holds promise as a paradigm that can establish the relevance 
of academic information systems (IS) research for IS practice [1].  However, unless 
such research develops a solid contribution to theory, the paradigm loses its impor-
tance to academia [2].  While there is substantial work that describes design science 
theories [3-4], less is known about the process of creating theories in design science.  
If design theory is indeed a particular kind of theory, it follows that design theorizing 
may be a particular kind of theorizing.  The purpose of this paper is to describe and 
illustrate an idealized process for theorizing in design science.  Such theorizing proc-
esses are important in design science research if the paradigm is to maintain its  
contribution to the IS academic tradition while simultaneously making significant 
advances in IS practice.   
The substantiation of a strong theoretical contribution is often regarded as prima 
facie evidence of high quality in scholarly work.  However, definitions of “strong” 
theory, not to mention theory itself are so contentious among academics that it may be 
easier to exclude non-theory than it is to inclusively define theory [5].  Alternatively, 
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a focus on the quality of the process of theorizing may be more meaningful than 
evaluating the quality of the theory under development [6].  Thus, the issues of the 
quality of the theory (as a product) are intertwined with the quality of the theorizing 
(as a process) because theorizing is critical in producing good theories; and necessar-
ily to high quality research that contributes substantial theories.  There are elabora-
tions of inductive theorizing [7-10], deductive theorizing [11], and richer conceptions 
of theorizing as messy, human behavior [12].  Different research paradigms take on 
different theorizing approaches that lead to different types of theory, e.g., systematic, 
formal, or axiomatic [13]. 
Theory in design science research is deemed by many authorities to be so impor-
tant that a distinct class of design theory is widely accepted [3-4].  These theories 
have specific components, for example, meta-requirements, a meta-design, a design 
method, testable product hypotheses, testable process hypotheses, etc.  Design theo-
ries will typically encompass a design process for applying a meta-design for the 
purposes of instantiating a designed artifact.  While there is an established body of 
work dedicated to explaining and understanding design theory and its components, 
there is a need for further examination of the process of theorizing for design.  In 
general, the literature recognizes that theory and theorizing are intertwined, suggest-
ing a need for more attention to design theorizing.  Understanding the theorizing of 
design is important because it should help guide design science researchers to build 
stronger design theories. 
Weick [12] recognizes that many discussions of design theorizing, like other theo-
rizing processes, are rational idealizations of a disciplined form of imagination.  The 
products of theorizing (theories) are social constructions that evolve from an ideation 
process of concurrent trials (conjectures) and errors (refutations).  It is often a variant 
of other sense-making processes such as generalization, prediction, and problem solv-
ing.  Unlike theory testing processes, theorizing is a search for plausibility rather than 
validity, and selecting one theory from among other imagined constructs may be be-
cause of its interest, believability, or beauty.  Theorizing is rarely mechanistic, but is 
often a process characterized by an “intuitive, blind, wasteful, serendipitous, creative 
quality” (p. 519). 
2   Deductive, Inductive, and Abductive Theorizing 
Theorizing refers to the process of constructing a theory [12].  It is often described as 
interim struggles in which patterns that explain the relation of one property with  
another are searched and proposed, and the truth of such proposed patterns is exam-
ined through experience [6, 14].  Also, theorizing may be a form of disciplined imagi-
nation in which concurrent trial-and-error thinking is iterated through imaginary  
experiments [12].  Weick [12] suggests that theorizing largely consists of three  
components: problem statements, thought trials, and selection criteria.  It is a process 
that involves concurrency and iteration in each of these components.  Kaplan [15] 
made a distinction between knowledge growth by extension and knowledge growth 
by intension.  Knowledge growth by extension concerns exploring new areas by  
applying the existing knowledge in one area to adjacent areas, whereas knowledge 
growth by intention concerns seeking more complete knowledge that operates within 
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a single area.  The assumption underlying these two theorizing strategies is the intel-
lectual reasoning method; knowledge growth by extension corresponds to inductive 
reasoning in which new knowledge is explored, whereas knowledge growth by inten-
tion corresponds to deductive reasoning in which existing knowledge is refined and 
tested.  Inductive and deductive reasoning have been two dominant theorizing ap-
proaches in many research disciplines. 
The origin of deductive reasoning dates back to ancient philosophy; Plato denied 
the validity of inductive sense making from experience, and asserted that only logical 
deduction is a valid method for developing theory, i.e., the hypothetico-deductive 
method.  Deductive theorizing involves deducing a conclusion from a general prem-
ise, i.e., a known theory, to a specific instance (i.e., an observation).  For instance, (a) 
premise: failure to incorporate user requirements leads to low user satisfaction, (b) 
instance: a system has failed to incorporate user requirements, (c) conclusion: the 
users of this system have low satisfaction.  At the heart of deductive reasoning is 
falsification which suggests that a theory can only be shown to be wrong, but never be 
proven to be right [11].  Theorists using a deductive approach deduce hypotheses 
from general knowledge and attempt to falsify them in a variety of settings; thus, a 
surviving theory is deemed to become more complete. 
In contrast, Aristotle recognized inductive reasoning as a valid method for generat-
ing knowledge, proceeding from particulars to generals.  Bacon later conceptualized 
inductive reasoning by arguing that a theory can be inductively developed through 
discovering essential nature of observations.  Inductive theorizing involves drawing a 
conclusion from specific instances.  For instance, (a) instance: every system that failed 
to incorporate user requirements has resulted in low user satisfaction, (b) conclusion: 
failure to incorporate user requirements leads to low user satisfaction.  Inductive  
theorizing is recognized a valid theorizing method by modern researchers [7-9, 16].  
While the literature on deductive and inductive reasoning crystallizes two contrast-
ing ways in which researchers can approach theorizing, Weick [12] criticizes such 
methodical views on theorizing, claiming that the process of theorizing is depicted as 
mechanistic when in fact it is intuitive and creative thinking process.  Weick further 
argues that theorizing should be seen as sense making in that it involves a searching 
process where explanatory relationships are sought in concepts observed in the real 
world [17-18].  Theorizing may go beyond just a mechanistic approach based on 
deductive or inductive reasoning when it indeed involves making sense out of a phe-
nomenon in a complex and open system.  Furthermore, the product that comes out of 
theorizing may not always be a singular truth, but rather a situated truth that explains 
the given phenomenon well enough per human’s intuition and creativity.   
Simon [19] associated design logic with imperative logic, contrasting this with the 
declarative logic that inhabits both inductive and deductive reasoning.  Recognizing 
that imperative logic is complicated by value judgments, Simon used the term satis-
ficing to refer to the fact that the optimal solution is difficult to obtain, and “figures of 
merit permit comparison between designs in terms of ‘better’ and ‘worse’ but seldom 
provide a judgment of ‘best’” (p. 138).  Neither deductive nor inductive theorizing 
seems to correspond with Simon’s description of optimal solution, but rather a dis-
covery process of trial-and-error searching through declarative space.  This search 
process echoes Weick’s sense-making theorizing concept. 
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In the management field, design thinking has been adopted as a new concept, and it 
refers to “the designer’s sensibility and methods to match people’s needs with what is 
technologically feasible and what a viable business strategy can convert into cus-
tomer value and market opportunity.” [20, p. 2].  Martin [21] argues that design 
thinking relies on abductive reasoning in which sense making of an observation oc-
curs through drawing inference to the best explanation.  Peirce [22] argues that “ab-
duction is, after all, nothing but guessing” (p. 137) in that its goal is to derive a possi-
ble conclusion in terms of what can be possibly true as opposed to declarative logic 
whose goal is to determine a proposition to be true or false.  Abductive reasoning 
involves drawing a possible precondition from a specific consequence.  For instance, 
one might conclude that (b) failure to incorporate user requirements leads to low user 
satisfaction from the specific instance that (a) a newly developed system did not lead 
to high user satisfaction.  Such reasoning is considered a fallacy in deductive logic 
(affirming the consequent), but is acceptable in abduction.  Such a conclusion is an 
acceptable explanation in abduction because (1) it is one of many possible explana-
tions for instance, (2) it is useful in understanding the phenomena, and (3) it can serve 
as a basis for solving the problem.  Comparison of three reasoning approaches is 
shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Three Theorizing Approaches 
 Deductive Inductive Abductive 
Purpose Declarative Declarative Post Hoc Ergo Propter 
Hoc (i.e., "after this, 




Closed System Open System Open System 
Logic Deriving an  
explanation for a given 
instance from the 
existing body of 
knowledge 
Inferring a general 
conclusion from a 
specific instance 
Inferring satisficing 
explanation for a 
specific consequence 
The abductive reasoning approach is useful for design theorizing, because the pur-
pose of design theory is to enable search for a satisficing solution for a given design 
problem.  Its purpose is not to derive a hypothesis from the existing body of knowl-
edge and test it in a closed system (deductive theorizing); nor does it intend to infer a 
conclusion from an observation in an open system (inductive theorizing).  Consistent 
with this, Gregor [23] argues that deductive reasoning alone is insufficient in address-
ing design problems, because for most design problems there exist a range of  
potential solutions rather than a single standout solution.  Deductive and inductive 
reasoning are certainly applicable and useful for design theorizing, but abductive 
reasoning may be more important and more common among researchers.  Quite pos-
sibly, deductive and inductive claims may often be useful as rhetorical vehicles, 
 post-hoc rationalizations of messy design theorizing processes, that explain why the 
design theories that proceed from design science research ought to be accepted as 
scientifically valid [24]. 
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3   Design Theorizing 
There is a substantial body of literature concerning the definition of design theory and 
what constitutes a design theory.  Walls et al [4] define an information system design 
theory (ISDT) as “a prescriptive theory which integrates normative and descriptive 
theories into design paths intended to produce more effective information systems” 
(p. 36).  In the IS design science research community, design theories are believed to 
be prescriptive, practical, basis for action, principles-based, and dualist constructs 
[3, 25].  Although design theory is generally believed to be practical, it is argued by 
many that design theory needs to be grounded in relevant reference theories, e.g., 
kernel theories [4, 26].  Further, Walls et al [4] elaborate seven components that a 
design theory should have, including meta-requirements, meta-design, design method, 
kernel theories, etc.  Focusing on the dualistic assumption of design theory, Basker-
ville and Pries-Heje [25] present a simplified view of design theory that consists of 
two parts: design practice theory concerning “the theoretical component about design 
practice” and explanatory design theory concerning “the theoretical component 
about the design artifact” (p. 273). 
With respect to theorizing for design, Walls et al [4] implicitly discuss how a  
design theory can emerge by showing the relationships between the components of 
design theory.  Also, Gregor and Jones [3] discuss the relations between different types 
of theory, implying that theory for design and action can by guided by other types of 
theory, such as theory for explaining and prediction, theory for predicting, etc.  More 
recently, Gregor [23] presents a high-level framework along with seven principles for 
design theory development by drawing on distinct characteristics of design science 
research.  While these seminal essays have significantly enhanced our understanding of 
design theory development, what appears to be missing is a granular understanding of 
design theorizing process, i.e., what are specific elements and activities involved in the 
design theorizing process?  While we recognize that theory building is a highly  
creative, thought process that cannot be easily captured in an explicit manner,  
development of an idealized process for design theorizing can aid both design science 
researchers and designers in solving so called wicked design problems [27]. 
One reason as to why theorizing for design is not well understood (besides its intui-
tive and creative nature) may have something to do with lack of consensus on what 
constitutes a theoretical contribution in design science research.  Motivated by this 
issue, Aier and Fischer [28] present a set of six criteria that can be used to evaluate 
progress in design theories.  Further, Keuchler and Vaishnaive [29] suggest that  
developing a design theory is inextricably bound to refinement and extension of  
kernel theories, and what may emerge in this theory refinement process is in fact  
mid-range theory that is particularly useful for constructing information systems  
artifact.  However, a closer examination of design theorizing process which operates 
within the human mind is warranted to reveal how theorizing for design actually  
unfolds. Further, the role that theories play may vary across different design science 
research projects, i.e., kernel theories, mid-range theories, post-hoc rationalizations of 
design theorizing processes, etc.  Although we do not discuss this issue explicitly in 
this paper, development of an idealized theorizing process may lead to a more  
differentiated discussion of the necessity of theory and theorizing process in design 
science research. 
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4   A Design Theorizing Framework 
The need for a focus on design theorizing suggests the potential value of a framework 
to aid understanding of how we theorize for design and what key activities are  
involved in developing a design theory.  The purpose of the framework is not to  
prescribe a mechanical method that a researcher can follow to theorize for design, but 
rather to identify and organize the essential activities in the theorizing process  
(see Figure 1). 
 
Fig. 1. Design Theorizing Framework 
4.1   Theorizing Domains 
A key underlying assumption of this framework is that theorizing for design operates 
in two distinct domains: an abstract domain and an instance domain.  In the abstract 
domain, a solution search process occurs in which an abstract solution is searched for 
an abstract problem.  Simon [19] uses the highway design example to illustrate that 
solution search process operates at the conceptual level in which specific construction 
plans, such as particular locations, are not specified.  The abstract domain is general-
ized, operating at a theoretical with a “class of problems”, a “class of goals”, or a 
“class of artifacts” [4, p. 42] rather than particulars.  In contrast, the instance domain 
refers to where an instance (particular) solution is applied to address an instance  
(particular) problem.  Further, the two theorizing domains operate on their own  
independent ground; specifically, there are fewer constraints on the development of 
abstract solution search process.  For instance, the abstract solution is not constrained 
to or restrained by an instance problem.  Following Weick’s notion of disciplined 
imagination, operations within the abstract domain often build on a basis that is ex-
plicit, novel, and interesting in a way that “stands out in [one’s] attention in contrast 
to the web of routinely taken-for-granted propositions” [30, p. 311].  In contrast, an 
instance domain may not be as novel, and interesting as an abstract domain; most 
interesting theoretical insights are discovered when researchers think independently 
from their observations/data [6, 31-32] . 
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These two theorizing domains highlight the notable duality in design theories.  
Most pronunciations of design theory elements demonstrate two fundamental parts: a 
design practice theory and an explanatory design theory [25].  This duality can be 
drawn from Simon’s original work [19] and is very clearly represented in the Walls et 
al. framing of design theory [4] to include such elements as design methods,  
meta-requirements, and meta-designs.  In the transition from the abstract domain to 
the instance domain we can locate design practice theory and design methods.  Design 
practice theory mainly concerns bringing a proposed design artifact to life; it emerges 
by moving from abstract domain to instance domain, i.e., development of an instance 
solution based on an abstract solution.  Design methods operate similarly.  In the 
abstract domain, we can locate explanatory design theory, meta-requirements, and 
meta-designs.  Explanatory design theory concerns “principles that relate require-
ments to an incomplete description of an object” [25, p.273].  Therefore, explanatory 
design theory emerges out of abstract solution search process where a search for the 
right set of command variables takes place, and abstract requirements of a design 
artifact are identified [19].  Walls et al. [4] used the term ‘meta-requirements’ to show 
how the functional requirements and basic features that constitute a class of design 
artifacts are abstract. 
4.2   Theorizing Activities 
There are four activities in the theorizing framework, each represented by an arrow in 
Figure 1. These activities are abstraction, solution search, de-abstraction, and  
registration.  Given that all four of these activities may take place as human thought, it 
may be possible that these occur not cyclically (as represented in Figure 1), or in the 
order implied by the arrows, but perhaps may arise simultaneously.  In terms of ac-
tivities, please recognize that the framework is an idealization to aid in understanding 
and comprehending what can be involved in design theorizing.  Each activity is  
described below.  
Abstraction. A theory is said to have generalizability when it is applicable across 
different settings that go beyond a specific setting in which it was tested [33-34]. 
Generalizability of a theory is a concern to most theorists, as theories that fail to  
produce generalized inferences are not considered a strong theory, or not a theory at 
all [5-6, 30].  Design theory is no exception.  A strong design theory should show 
applicability across widely different settings, and address a broad class of design 
problems.  Theory is said to arise from identifying the key links between data and 
prescriptions (or propositions) by discarding detailed information, and the abstraction 
is a process of deriving key concepts observed in a specific instance [6].  In design 
theorizing, abstraction can be realized when a researcher derives common concepts or 
ideas from an instance problem by removing details pertaining to the context of the 
instance problem; by doing so, a broad set of problems can be identified.  This  
process of abstraction essentially involves reflective judgment where unknown  
universals for given particulars are sought [35].  When people recognize a problem 
which cannot be solved intuitively, they rely on their cognitive faculties to distinguish 
between the peculiarities and the essential conditions for the problem [35-37].  During 
this process, reflective judgments are called for to understand the problem at a more 
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universal level.  Most design problems cannot be solved intuitively or with certainty.  
It is this uncertain nature of design problems that calls for reflective judgment to  
decide which essential conditions are applicable to a broader class of problems than 
just the one at hand.  For example, a system user may express his or her frustration for 
being unable to locate documents effectively in a knowledge management system (an 
instance problem).  Abstraction can be achieved by extracting the key concepts  
related in the problem, such as user frustration and systems search functionality (an 
abstract problem). 
Solution search. Simon [19] describes how the solution search process (i.e., a  
goal-seeking system) communicates with the outside environment through two 
channels: the afferent (the world of the senses) and the efferent (the motor world).  
The afferent is a sensory world where outside environment is perceived by regarding 
its state, and the efferent is the world where actions are taken.  These two worlds 
operate at the abstract level; the problem environment is recognized through stored 
memory information in the human mind, and any particular actions are imaginary 
[19]. The attainability of goals is determined by making associations between 
elements of the imagined environment with the elements of the imagined actions.  
These associations are “between particular changes in states of the world and 
particular actions that will bring these changes about” (p. 141).  Thus, theorizing for 
the solution search concerns understanding relationships between the afferent and 
efferent, and how the afferent responds to the changes made by actions in the efferent.  
This process is highly iterative, and requires searching for the right set of actions in 
the efferent (e.g., creating components of a design artifact) that will bring sufficient 
changes in the afferent (e.g., solving the requirements of the problem).  Thus, an 
important element in this process is theorizing for the generalized components and the 
generalized requirements of a design artifact.  Each component of the imagined 
artifacts (the efferent) would have to be theorized individually and collectively in the 
context of the afferent.  The functional explanation of the imagined design artifacts 
proceeds from this theorizing process, i.e., an explanatory design theory [25].  
De-Abstraction. During the solution search, proposed solutions or design artifacts 
may be theoretical, abstract concepts; these are imagined, generalized problems and 
solutions.  Thus, in order for these to be tested in a specific setting, the generalized, 
abstract concepts need to be narrowed and instantiated for a particularized setting and 
a particularized artifact.  This de-abstraction involves adding details pertaining to a 
specific context in which the solution will be applied, and all the details of the 
instance solution become articulated.  De-abstraction essentially requires 
deterministic judgment in which we can subsume given particulars under known 
universals [35].  De-abstraction is a realization process that may still be partly 
imaginary; potentially a thought experiment within a design theory is tried as the basis 
for an imaginary artifact within the designer’s mind.  Obviously, it may also become 
partly (or wholly) materialized as an instantiated artifact in reality. 
Registration.  Whether the design artifact resulting from the de-abstraction process is 
imaginary or material, the design has to further try this outcome against an instance of 
the problem setting to verify that the instance outcome has potential to serve the needs 
of an instance of the problem.  Like the de-abstraction outcome, this problem instance 
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may also be wholly imaginary or more-or-less material.  Consequently this “trial” 
may be more-or-less a thought experiment or more-or-less material and empirical.  
Registering the theory means trying an instance of the solution against an instance of 
the problem, and adjusting the theory to more exactly correspond to the requirements 
of the instance.  Such adjustments can lead to further abstraction activity as theory 
adjustments may have more general effects.  Because the registration activity is part 
of the theorizing process, it may be (or may not be) independent of the design science 
research evaluation process.  Evaluation, in design science research, is usually  
regarded as a validation or proof process where a design theory is shown empirically 
to stand in terms of how well a resulting artifact performs or to what degree it works 
as intended [38-40].  While conceptually the evaluation ought to occur after the  
theorizing process has matured to completion, it could be regarded as a final registra-
tion activity in which it is shown empirically that no further adjustment is required. 
4.3   Theorizing Threshold 
There is no universal starting point in the design theorizing framework.  We believe 
that theorizing begins when some stimulation threshold is exceeded that drives the 
processes of disciplined imagination and abduction to start one or more of the design 
theorizing activities.  Intuitively, we might think that theorizing always commences 
with a recognition of an instance problem, and proceeds in the following order; identi-
fication of an abstract problem, development of an abstract solution, particularizing an 
instance of this solution, and registering it to the originating instance problem (this 
order is indicated by the arrows in the framework).  This order would reflect the ideal 
essence of design science research whose aim is to achieve a clearly stated goal, i.e., 
bring an intended change to the real world through creation of a new design theory 
and its resulting artifact [4, 41].  However, reflecting on our own research experience 
indicates that such an origin for these activities and such an order may be idealiza-
tions.  It is not the only way that theorizing can take place.  As a human sense-making 
process, theorizing can be messy. 
We returned to two of our own design science research projects and reflected on 
the theorizing process that emerged in these cases.  We chose cases that appear in 
published research to enable interested readers to examine the process and the results 
of the theorizing more carefully.  We selected one case in which the design theorizing 
threshold was first crossed in the instance domain, and one case in which the design 
theorizing threshold was crossed in the abstract domain. 
Case 1: Crossing the threshold in the instance domain and theorizing the design 
theory nexus. This work developed a method for constructing decision systems along 
with instantiations for organizational change decision-making and user involvement 
decision-making. The theory in this work centered on a conceptual structure called a 
design theory nexus as a means for addressing the “wicked problem” of multi-criteria 
decision-making. The instantiations included an IT artifact based on spreadsheet 
software, used empirically in organizations to help decision makers determine what 
organizational change approach or what user involvement approach to adopt. A  
subjective evaluation of the artifacts by participants was positive in terms of their 
satisfaction in use, and their intention to adopt the outcome artifact results. 
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In the projects associated with this theory, the theorizing threshold was first 
crossed in the instance domain, when researchers began conducting search  
conferences (a form of action research) in an organization to unearth a possible organ-
izational change approach.  The results led to a taxonomy of change methods  
(reported in [42]), which was still very much in the instance domain.  Theorizing 
moved to an abstract domain when the problem was generalized into a form later 
recognized as multi-criteria decision making (an abstract problem), and the concept of 
a theory nexus [43] adapted as an abstract solution.  The theorizing process returned 
to the instance domain where it was registered against an organizational change  
instance.  The process went through further abstraction-and-instance cycles that  
included development of the instance solution for selecting a user involvement  
approach in IT-developing projects.  The theorizing result of these further cycles 
clarified the aspects of the theory in spanning both single-criterion and multi-criteria 
decision settings (the user involvement approach proved to be single-criterion - for 
further case details see [27]). 
Case 2: Crossing the threshold in the abstract domain and theorizing a software 
process improvement design theory. This work developed a design theory that 
generalized alternative, competing models for improving software organizations.  The 
theory proposed a universal 4-stage model that explained how software process 
improvement generally progressed in organizations.  Each stage was elaborated with a 
conceptual model of its possible elements.  These models were then instantiated with 
examples (specimens) of published software process and organizational improvement 
methods such as Six Sigma, CMMI, Balanced Scorecard etceteras.  The validation 
was anchored to the evidence used to instantiate the published examples within the 
models.  
Like case 1, this work developed an initial framework for comparing and  
contrasting alternative models for improving software organizations.  However, this 
theorizing threshold was crossed initially in the abstract domain as a search for  
universals in software process improvement.  There were no software improvement 
instances driving this search, just a scholarly curiosity (details of the initial framework 
are reported in [44]).  Unlike case 1, both the abstract and the instances were thought 
processes; more imaginary than empirical.  The instances drawn into the cycles of 
theorizing were published methods and frameworks.  While real to a certain extent, 
these instances were registered completely through conceptual argumentation rather 
than field experiments.  As the process went through further abstraction-and-instance 
cycles, the theory was reframed within a body of technological rules as well as the 
process models (this design theory is elaborated in [45]). 
4.4   Discussion 
In Case 1, the problem instance and its immediate solution were developed first as a 
more-or-less un-theorized design, a classification of major organizational change 
approaches according to their central feature.  Such designs have been described as 
the result of pre-theory in research [46].  In Case 1, the abstract problem and abstract 
solution were identified later in the research.  Our theorizing for Case 1 occurred in 
the following order: instance problem – instance solution – abstract problem –  
abstract solution.  In contrast, in Case 2 theorizing began with recognition of an  
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abstract problem; that is, a problem was recognized in a researchers’ mind at the  
abstract level (a set of personal/professional experiences may have led to problem 
recognition at the abstract level, but an instance problem was not yet clearly defined).  
Our theorizing for Case 2 occurred in the following order: abstract problem – abstract 
solution – instance solution – instance problem.  The fact that theorizing began with 
identification of an abstract problem independently from any instance problem  
supports our proposition that theorizing operates in two distinct domains.  In Case 2, 
the search for an abstract solution began without any constraints imposed by an  
initiating recognition of an instance problem.  Importantly in this case, de-abstraction 
played more significant role than abstraction, as an abstract solution was applied to 
develop an instance solution and an abstract problem was applied to identify an  
instance problem. 
The two cases are summarized in Table 2.  In both cases it is difficult to find any 
explicit observations that unveil the abstraction process.  This is consistent with its 
nature as a cognitive process of reflective judgment.  More detailed research notes 
would be required; something akin to a personal diary would be necessary to explicate 
the abstraction activities in these cases.  Still these experiences indicate support for 
the proposition of two distinct theorizing domains, and they show how theorizing can 
begin at multiple points in the theorizing framework. 
Table 2. Examples of Theorizing Thresholds 
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This empirical evaluation using the past research projects reveals a need for future 
research.  While we believe that the framework proposed in this paper provides a 
solid conceptualization of design theorizing, further empirical investigation is  
warranted to critically evaluate and improve the proposed framework.  Given that 
theorizing is a thought process, and can be messy, methods that enable a close exami-
nation of human thinking, such as protocol analysis [48-49] and thought experiment 
[50], may provide a useful means to evaluate and improve the proposed framework.  
Further, a more systematic analysis of design science research publications is  
warranted to exploit the different roles that theory play in design science research, and 
to assess how the proposed framework for theorizing process can be applied and 
adapted in different cases. 
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5   Conclusion 
In this paper we described and illustrated an idealized theorizing process for design 
theories.  In this process design theorizing operates across two distinct domains; the 
instance domain encompasses an instantiated solution that is applied to solve an  
instantiated problem, and the abstract domain encompasses an abstract solution that is 
devised to solve an abstract problem.  We identified four theorizing activities in this 
process and discussed the role of each activity in developing a design theory.  Three 
conclusions emerge as our contribution. 
First, design theorizing necessitates making connections between an abstract  
domain and an instance domain: abstraction and de-abstraction.  Abstraction concerns 
reflective judgment where search for unknown universals for given particulars takes 
place, whereas de-abstraction concerns deterministic judgment where given particu-
lars are subsumed under known universals.  Through the process of de-abstraction, 
design practice theory that involves the instantiation of a proposed design artifact may 
emerge.  Any particular stand-alone design solution that lacks connections with an 
abstract class of design solutions (and/or a class of design problems) is incomplete as 
a theory.  Particular design solutions may be close to design theories, but the level of 
abstraction needs to be raised to a class basis that is explicit, novel, and interesting. 
Second, a review of the literature on theorizing reveals two dominant theorizing 
approaches (deductive and inductive) that have been adopted in different research 
paradigms.  While these two theorizing approaches are a useful reasoning tool for 
theory development, theorizing for design often necessitates adoption of a line of 
reasoning that is essential for problem solving, i.e., abductive reasoning.  Theorizing 
in design science is abductive because it seeks an imperative logic (rather than de-
clarative) in order to address design problem through the conceptualization of a  
design artifact.  This theorizing process provides a good example of disciplined 
imagination involving intuitive and creative thinking processes.  The adoption of 
abductive reasoning for design theorizing enables the search for a satisficing solution 
for a given design problem.  Further, through the activity of abstract solution search, 
functional explanations (explanatory design theory) that identification the reasons for 
meta-requirements result. 
Third, reflections on the authors’ own prior design science research projects reveal 
that there is no universal starting point with which design theorizing commences; any 
origin or ordering in theorizing activities indicated in Figure 1 would be an idealiza-
tion.  A review of two cases shows how the theorizing threshold can be first crossed 
in either the instance domain or the abstract domain.   
Theory is an important and central element in research.  Different research para-
digms take on different approaches for theorizing.  If design theory is a particular kind 
of theory, it follows that design theorizing may be a particular kind of theorizing.  An 
essential part of design theorizing may involve abductive reasoning because there is a 
purpose aimed at guiding learning and problem solving.  The framework proposed in 
this paper is aimed toward building strong design theories in the design science  
paradigm by providing an idealized theorizing process for design science research. 
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